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ABSTRACT
Five chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were tested to assess their understanding of causality in a tool task.
The task consisted of a transparent tube with a trap-hole drilled in its middle. A reward was randomly
placed on either side of the hole. Depending on which side the chimpanzee inserted the stick into, the
candy was either pushed out of the tube or into the trap. In Experiment 1, the success rate of 2
chimpanzees rose highly above chance, but that of the other subjects did not. Results show that the 2
successful chimpanzees selected the correct side for insertion beforehand. Experiment 2 ruled out the
possibility that their success was due to a distance-based associative rule, and the results favor an
alternative hypothesis that relates success to an understanding of the causal relation between the toolusing action and its outcome.

According to Cheney and Seyfarth (1990), cognition is the ability to relate different unconnected pieces of
information in new ways and apply the resulting knowledge in an adaptive manner. Similarly, knowledge
concerning the behavior of objects allows one to act on them effectively and to predict their behavior
(Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). Tool use is a goal directed behavior that allows an
organism to overcome a wide variety of problems: Tool use connects means to goals, causes to effects,
in ways that respond to the requirements of the task.
The capacity to use tools has been considered one of the major achievements of the human species both
at the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels. The acquisition of means-ends relations and tool use is an
important acquisition in child development (Piaget, 1952, 1954), and they are among the few measures of
cognitive development that correlate with language acquisition (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, &
Volterra, 1979). During the 2nd year of life, children begin to solve tool-using problems by trial and error.
Children are also gradually able to analyze the problems they face and to comprehend the cause-effect
relations between action and outcome. Thus, children acquire the capacity to anticipate the outcome of
their actions, mentally represent such outcomes, and plan their behavior accordingly.

Several primate species, such as chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), orangutans ( Pongo pygmaeus ), and
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), show repertoires of tool-using behaviors that appear similar in terms
of variety and complexity (Beck, 1980; McGrew, 1992; Tuttle, 1986: Visalberghi. 1990; Visalberghi &
Trinca, 1989). However, according to Reynolds (1982),
tools are as much mental as material, and their description is not a photograph of the
material object itself but an empirically verifiable characterization of the mental
knowledge and behavioral programs which allow the object to be produced and used. (p.
377)
At this level of investigation, it may be possible to characterize and contrast the key features of tool use in
different species that exhibit behaviors similar in appearance.
For example, when a primate uses a stick to displace a reward and thereby render it accessible, does it
foresee where the reward is going to go in space? Can it learn to anticipate or represent where its action
is going to displace the reward? Does success in tasks that require the displacement of an object by
means of another object imply an appreciation of causality? Can success be achieved otherwise?
It is difficult to extract from field observations information about the extent to which an animal appreciates,
anticipates, or represents the outcome of its own behavior. Often, as is the case for termite fishing
(McGrew, Tutin, & Baldwin, 1979), neither the human observer nor the chimpanzee itself can precisely
assess the requirements of the task and the best strategy for success. For example, by observing an
animal's use of a tool for termite fishing, it is not possible to assess how deep the termites are in the
mound and, accordingly, how long the tool must be to retrieve them. In this case, the human observer can
evaluate performance but not competence; success provides a measure of how well the animal handles
the task but not the cognitive strategies it uses.
Field studies may frustrate an experimental approach; however, observations in the wild do provide ideas
for experiments in the laboratory. An experimental approach may offer an opportunity to present subjects
with tasks in controlled situations (e.g., Kummer, Dasser, & Hoyningen-Huene, 1990). For example,
paleoanthropologists have found new insights on flaking behavior by providing a bonobo (Pan paniscus)
with suitable stones for flaking; they demonstrated that the animal was capable of flaking and of
appreciating the relation between the sharpness of flakes and their efficiency in cutting (Toth, Schick,
Savage-Rumbaugh, Sevcik, & Rumbaugh, 1993). Similarly, Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994) designed
an experiment to test whether tool-using capuchin monkeys were able to represent the consequences of
their action before the execution of the action itself. For this purpose, Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994)
presented capuchins with a transparent horizontal tube that had a trapping hole in the middle (trap tube).
A food reward was randomly placed on either side of the hole. Depending on the side in which the stick
was inserted, the reward was either pushed out of the tube or fell through the hole into the trap and
became inaccessible. Both the capuchin and the human observer could monitor the position of the reward
and the effect of the tool on the movement of the reward. Therefore, the nature of the trap-tube task and
its visibility were such as to provide systematic information about the subjects' strategies to solve it.
In the trap-tube task, a subject can be 50% successful simply by systematically inserting the stick into the
same side of the tube or by inserting it in one of the two sides in every trial by chance. In contrast, rates of
success higher than chance can be obtained by avoiding the trap. In the latter case, the subjects could
either choose right away the correct side for insertion. or they could first insert the stick and, by watching
the tube-reward-stick configuration or monitoring their own attempts, decide their next approach. The
former behavior implies an a priori representation of an action that fulfills the requirements of the task
(representational strategy), whereas the latter implies an appreciation of the outcome of the ongoing

action (anticipatory strategy). (Note that in the anticipatory strategy, representational elements also play a
role.) Therefore, this distinction aims mainly at characterizing performances in which the entire strategy is
correctly planned in advance from performances in which the strategy is not correctly planned and the
subject changes the side of insertion.
Furthermore, in the trap-tube task, it is possible to investigate the processes that lead the subject to
above-chance solution, that is, whether the subject develops a rule of action (associative process) or
understands that some key features of the task, such as the trap, affect the outcome of the pushing action
(comprehension of causality process). We note that the latter process is a multifaceted ability that a
species may possess to different extents in relation to different physical principles or in different domains.
In this experimental study, we considered causal comprehension to be the subject's knowledge about the
causal relation between its pushing action with the stick and the consequent movement of the reward into
the trap or out of the tube.
In a previous study with the trap-tube paradigm (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994), it was found that only 1
capuchin subject (out of 4) was successful above chance. This successful performance was anticipatory
and was based on an associative process. On the basis of these results, Visalberghi and Limongelli
argued that the capuchins tested did not understand the causal consequences of their actions nor did
they appear to learn to do so on the basis of repeated experiences. These findings are in contrast to
Chevalier-Skolnikoff's (1989) claim that capuchin monkeys understand the causal relation between tooluse behavior and outcome.
The literature on the use of tools in chimpanzees shows that tool-using behavior appears spontaneously
in a variety of contexts, is flexible, and often (as is the case for children) requires years of practice to be
fully mastered (e.g., nut-cracking behavior, Boesch, 1991, 1993; Boesch & Boesch, 1983; termite fishing,
McGrew et al., 1979; see also Nishida & Hiraiwa, 1982). In addition, there are solid data that show that
when nuts are not yet in view, chimpanzees look for, select, and carry hammers of different weights and
material (wood vs. stone) according to the type of nuts (i.e., their hardness) they intend to crack open
(Boesch & Boesch. 1990). Furthermore, when at the tool site, chimpanzees seem to use the tool
efficiently and with foresight: They choose the most appropriate tool available to them, they position the
nut on the anvil so that their hits become more effective, and as Matsuzawa (1991) recently reported,
they sometimes make use of a wedge stone to keep the anvil stone flat and stable. Therefore, field
observations strongly support the hypothesis that chimpanzees represent in advance the requirement of
the problem they are going to deal with and the relation between their actions and the outcome (McGrew,
1992).
The capacity to attribute mental states to others involves the comprehension of the causal relation
between seeing and knowing. Recent experimental studies have shown that chimpanzees are capable of
perspective taking, mental attribution, and empathy (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990, 1992). These
findings suggest that chimpanzees may possess the requisite representational abilities to effectively solve
the trap-tube task.
In this experimental study we examined the behavioral strategies (representational or anticipatory) used
by chimpanzees to perform a goal-directed activity in the context of a tool-using task (Experiment 1) and
the cognitive processes (association or comprehension of causality) that may underlie such strategies
(Experiment 2).
In Experiment 1, we used the same experimental design previously adopted for capuchins by Visalberghi
and Limongelli (1994). On the basis of the literature on tool use in chimpanzees and the recent
experimental findings that chimpanzees may be able to appreciate the causal relation between seeing

and knowing (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990, 1992), we anticipated that chimpanzees would be
capable of understanding the causal relations involved in this tool task.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects
Five common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) served as subjects (3 males. Darrell, 13 years old. Kermit,
12 ½ years old, and Bobbv 5 ½ years old, and 2 females, Sarah, 34 years. old, and Sheba, 11 ½ years
old). Kermit and Darrell were peer-raised in a laboratory nursery until ages 3 and 3 ½ respectively, and
Sheba was human cross-fostered from 4 months until she was 2 ½ years. Sarah was wild born and has
been the subject of over 2 decades of studies on linguistic and other cognitive abilities (e.g., Premack.
1976). Bobby came from the entertainment business and arrived at the lab at age 19 months old; he had
training on a variety of matching-to-sample studies and other cognitive abilities.
All animals had been immersed in interactional training with their teachers and caregivers in a variety of
cognitive tasks (see for example, Povinelli et al.. 1990: Boysen. 1992, 1993: Boysen, Berntson, Shreyer,
& Quigley, 1993). However, the chimpanzees had not had formal testing of their tool-use abilities. In the
past the subjects had received as an environmental enrichment device a bucket-and-stick apparatus to
accommodate dipping behaviors, and they also showed a variety of spontaneous tool-using behaviors
with play objects and other materials available in their enclosure (e.g. straw and sticks).
Apparatus
Plain rube. In the baseline condition the apparatus was a horizontal transparent polycarbonate (Lexan)
tube 46 cm long and with an internal diameter of 3.7 cm.
Trap-tube apparatus. The trap-tube apparatus was similar to the plain tube, with the exception that it had
a cylindrical trap (4 cm deep) secured below a 3.6-cm hole in the center of the tube.
All the chimpanzees adopted two alternative strategies of solution: One consisted of pushing with the
stick with enough force that the reward jumped over the hole (a successful skip strategy) and the second,
of hitting the trap or the tube from above so that the rewards caught in the trap bounced out of the trap,
back into the tube. By using these strategies the subjects could ignore the presence of the trap, and they
were not compelled to choose the side for insertion on the basis of the position of the reward. Therefore,
the apparatus was slightly modified to maintain the required experimental constraints (see Figure 1).
In the new version of the apparatus, the tube remained visible but could not be hit directly (the Lexan
transparent sides of an A-frame protected it), and the trap consisted of a wider hole that could not be
skipped. The trap tube was a 50-em-long tube with a hole 11 cm long and 4 cm wide in its middle part.
This tube was secured in a transparent Lexan A-frame with the tube readily visible. No trap was used,
however, because the A-frame sides prevented the chimpanzees from retrieving the candy rewards that
fell to the ground through the hole. Because the A-frame apparatus has the same cognitive requirements
of the trap tube, we refer to either tube as a trap tube.
The A-frame apparatus was introduced at Block 5 for Sarah, at Block 3 for Darrell, at Block 4 for Kermit
and Sheba, and at Block 7 for Bobby.
The tube was mounted on an inverted V-shaped metal frame that held the tube 46 cm above the ground.
The A-frame apparatus was also fixed to this metal frame. The entire apparatus was then fixed to the

floor of an outdoor cage (3.10 m wide × 2.36 m high × 5.32 m long). The distance of the apparatus from
the walls was at least 1.1 m. and the subject was thus free to move around it. The tool provided to push
the reward out of the tube was a wooden dowel (46 cm long and 3.2 cm in diameter).
Figure 1. The A-frame trap-tube apparatus. Bobby opens his mouth while pushing the reward with the stick.
In this case the reward (placed on the right hand side of the trap) is going to fall ino the trap because the
stick has been inserted in the wrong side of the tube.

Procedure
The subjects were tested individually. Baiting was not seen by a subject. A trial began when a
chimpanzee approached the apparatus (about 1 m) and attended to the tube. Before entering Experiment
1, the subjects (who were all naive with the tube task) were presented with 10 trials of the plain tube task,
which they spontaneously solved. The youngest subject, Bobby, required one instance of modeling by an
experimenter before he could reach solution for the first time. In the following trials, Bobbv did not perform
differently from the other subjects. Therefore, when Experiment 1 began, all subjects were equally
experienced and proficient in the simple version of the task.
The reward was placed on the right or left side of the trapping hole inside the tube (from the
experimenter's point of view). The reward could be obtained (solution) only by inserting a stick into the
side opposite to where the reward was located and pushing it out of the other opening. Conversely, if the
subject inserted the stick into the opening of the tube that was closer to the reward and pushed the stick,
the candy fell into the trapping hole (failure). Trials in which solution was reached by using alternative
strategies (e.g. skip strategy or hitting strategy) were discarded and repeated at the end of each block.
The subjects were exposed to the task in 14 blocks of 10 trials, and each subject underwent a maximum
of 3 blocks per day.

Behavioral Variables
The experiment was videotaped, and the following behavioral variables were scored from the tapes by
Luca Limongelli: (a) the number of successes and failures (i.e., number of rewards obtained or pushed
into the hole) per block; (b) the time to solution measured from when the subject first approached to within
1 m of the apparatus to when solution or failure was achieved (if a subject left the apparatus without
completing the trial, because it was distracted by noises or by social interactions in the other cages, the
stopwatch was stopped and reset); and (c) the side and the number of insertions performed, including
those that did not lead to success or failure.
Insertion was defined as the act of inserting the stick into the opening of the tube to a depth of at least 2
cm. As shown in Figure 2. a subject could then push the stick all the way through (single-insertion trial), or
it could retrieve the stick out of the tube and perform another insertion (in the same side or in the other;
multiple-insertion trial).
The performance of each chimpanzee was first analyzed to establish whether it was at chance or above
chance. Performances above chance were further analyzed to assess whether the subjects were
representing the requirements of the problem before acting on it (representational strategy) or whether
they first inserted the stick and then, by watching the tube-trap-reward-stick configuration and monitoring
their own attempts, decided what to do next (anticipatory strategy). For this purpose the trials were scored
to assess whether single insertions accounted for solution more than expected by chance. The
representational strategy was hypothesized when in a significant number of trials, success was achieved
after the subjects inserted the stick only once; otherwise, the representational strategy was rejected, and
an anticipatory strategy was hypothesized.
Finally, other behaviors relevant for distinguishing representational and anticipatory strategies were
scored from the tapes.
Data Analysis
The binomial test was adopted to assess the statistical significance of the results, the null hypothesis
being 50% success. The data were analyzed in terms of the number of successes per block, performance
in the first half of the experiment (Blocks 1-7) versus the second half of the experiment (Blocks 8-14), and
the number of right versus left insertions. Wilcoxon's test was used to compare times to solution.
Results
In the first trials all subjects behaved toward the trap tube as if it were a plain tube and reacted to the loss
of the reward. The chimpanzees attempted to recover the candies that had fallen into the trap and tried to
break the tube open with their hands or hit it with the stick. Furthermore, after they lost the reward, they
kept inserting and moving the stick back and forth inside the tube. Such behaviors decreased and
eventually disappeared within the first few blocks.
Only Darrell and Sheba solved the trap-tube task significantly above chance. Darrell's rate of success
was 69% (binomial test, N = 140, p < .001), and Sheba achieved 72% (binomial test, N = 140, p < .001;
see Table 1 and Figure 3). In particular, we note that although in Blocks 1-7, their performance was at
chance, their success in Blocks 8-14 increased dramatically, reaching 90% for Darrell and 99% for
Sheba.
To explore whether Sheba and Darrell used a representational strategy or an anticipatory strategy, we
analyzed their performance in Blocks 8-14, that is, once they were solving the task above chance. By

comparing the number of successful single-insertion trials with the number of successful multiple-insertion
trials, it is possible to assess which solution strategy was used. Under these criteria Sheba was able to
represent beforehand the outcome in 64 of 69 (93%) successful trials. Darrell solved the task by
representing beforehand the outcome in 52 of 63 (83%) successful trials.
Kermit's rate of success remained at chance throughout the experiment. Bobby's performance was
significantly below chance level throughout the experiment, and Sarah's performance was below chance
level for the first half of the experiment (Blocks 1-7) and remained at chance level thereafter (see Figure 3
and Table 1). Performance below chance may reflect a direct bias toward the candy and an associated
stick insertion in the nearest end of the tube.
Figure 2. The possible sequences of insertions of the stick into the trap tube. In both examples a reward is
placed on the right side of the trap. The choice made by the subject when inserting the stick for the first time
is described in the oval. The first insertion may be correct or incorrect; if the subject pushes the stick all way
through, the correct insertion leads to success, whereas the wrong insertion leads to failure. Arrows indicate
retrieval of the stick, and a new insertion in the same side of the tube. Dashed lines indicate retrieval of the
stick and a shift in the side of insertion.

A chimpanzee that performs multiple insertions and switches side of insertion has more opportunities of
experimenting with the relation between its actions and outcomes. For example, in the second insertion
the subject may persist in its choice or change it. In other words, depending on whether the previously
chosen side was correct or not, the subject can positively or negatively change the outcome of the trial by
shifting side. Obviously, if there is no side shift, the outcome of the trial is not changed. Following this line
of reasoning, we analyzed multiple-insertion trials in both successful and nonsuccessful subjects.
Overall, multiple insertions were infrequent. Both Kermit and Sarah performed multiple insertions in 1% of
the trials, Sheba in 4% of the trials, Bobby in 7% of the trials, and Darrell in 19% of the trials. The
performances of Bobby (an unsuccessful subject) and Darrell (a successful subject) on multiple insertion
trials were further investigated to assess whether multiple insertions represented a strategy for correcting
erroneous insertions. Data show that Bobby in 5 trials (across all blocks) shifted from the wrong side of
the tube to the correct side and that in 2 trials he shifted from the correct side to the wrong side. Darrell

instead never ended up in a failure by shifting side; in all the 11 trials in which he shifted side, he
corrected a wrong insertion.
Mean times to solution were 11.7 s for Sarah, 10.7 s for Darrell, 9.9 s for Kermit, 8.1 s for Sheba, and
42.0 s for Bobby. Bobby's mean time to solution was significantly higher than those of each of the other
subjects (Wilcoxon test, for all comparisons, ps < .01). Bobby's higher latencies to solution were mostly
because his trials were continuously interspersed with playful behaviors that involved the apparatus, the
tools, and other objects available in the cage. For each subject the comparison of the mean times to
solution in Blocks 1-7 with that in Blocks 8-14 did not evidence a change.
Table 1. Chimpanzees' Performance (Percentages of Correct Solutions) in Experiment 1
Blocks
Subject

1-14

1-7

8-14

Right-hand insertions

Sheba

71.4**

44.3

98.6**

67.1**

Darrell

69.3**

48.6

90.0**

30.7**

Kermit

55.0

57.1

52.8

60.7

Sarah

42.8

35.7*

50.0

24.3**

Bobby

32.1**

37.1*

27.1**

48.6

Note. Data are from 140 total trials. For data below 40%, a significance value indicates a significant prevalence of
failures. All significance values are based on binomial tests.
* p < .05. ** p < .001.

Qualitative Descriptions
Sarah. In Blocks 1-7, Sarah tended to choose the side of insertion closest to the reward, and thus her
success rate was below chance. In Blocks 8-14, she nearly always inserted the stick into the left side of
the tube (64 times out of 70; binomial test, p < .001), and overall, her way of approaching the apparatus
and her movements for inserting the stick became more stereotyped.
From Block 5 on, a new behavior appeared. Sarah, after inserting the stick into the tube and before
pushing it, positioned her hand at the other end of the tube, as if anticipating the arrival of the reward.
This behavior was noted in 32 trials, only 16 of which were solutions. This finding suggests that Sarah
was not correctly anticipating the actual consequence (failure or success) of her insertion of the stick
inside the tube.
Kermit. Across blocks Kermit showed different side preferences. The right-hand opening was chosen in
93% of the trials in Blocks 1-3, in 13% of the trials in Blocks 4-9, and in 98% of the trials in Blocks 10-14.
Kermit kept using the skip strategy even when the apparatus was modified by widening the trap hole so
that the reward could not skip over the hole anymore. He performed the skip strategy either while
inserting the stick in the wrong side (51 trials) or while inserting it in the correct side of the tube (53 trials).
Therefore, Kermit adopted the skip strategy, whether or not the trap was in the way. The fact that Kermit
attempted to prevent failure even in those trials in which his behavior would have been correct suggests
that he was not able to anticipate the outcome of his ongoing action with the tool.
Bobby. Bobby showed a preference for inserting into the left side of the tube only in Blocks 1-7 (45 left
insertions out of 70 trials; binomial test, p < .05), and as the experiment progressed, he adopted the

wrong strategy of inserting the stick into the opening of the tube closer to the reward, no matter if it was
the left or right side (51 failures out of 70 trials in Blocks 8-14; binomial test, p < .001).
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 1. Ten trials were given per block.

In 52 trials Bobby kept his mouth open at one opening of the tube while pushing the reward with the stick
from the other side (see Figure 1). In 27 trials the stick was inserted in the correct side of the tube, but in
25 trials it was inserted in the wrong side. These findings suggest that Bobby was not able to anticipate
failure or success.
Darrell. In the first half of the Experiment, Darrell preferred to insert the stick in the left side of the tube (63
left insertions out of 70 trials; binomial test, p < .001). In Blocks· 8-14, he attained 90% correct
performance and no longer exhibited a side bias.
On one occasion, during Sarah's Blocks 11 and 12, Darrell was in an adjacent cage and could readily see
the apparatus and Sarah working at the tube. In fact, during most of her trials, Darrell sat near the wire
mesh partition close to Sarah and the apparatus. (On that same day, Darrell had solved the trap-tube task
in 20 out of 20 trials.) In Block 11, Sarah persisted in inserting the stick from the left side of the tube only
and failed in Trials 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. During Trials 4, 6, and 9, Darrell uttered a low bark, which is a lowlevel alarm call in chimpanzees. It was not possible to assess whether this behavior was intentional or
not. On Sarah’s Trial 5 of Block 12, in which she again failed, Darrell spit some water at her, which had
not been previously observed. However, Darrell's behaviors did not seem to affect Sarah in any way.

Sheba. In the first half of the experiment, Sheba had a strong preference for inserting the stick into the
right-hand side of the tube (60 right insertions out of 70 trials; binomial test. p < .001), which she
abandoned abruptly in Block 8. From that point on she became highly successful.
During Trial 9 of Block 5, Sheba performed an unexpected type of tool behavior: She used long, rigid
pieces of straw to dislodge rewards that had fallen to the ground under the A-frame. In fact, there was a
narrow space between the floor and the panel of the frame, which allowed her to insert the straw and rake
out the candy. During Trial 10, soon after she made this discovery, she used a straw to rake in the reward
from inside the tube. That trial was discarded, and straw rigid enough for raking was removed from the
cage.
Experiment 2
In the study by Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994), the only successful capuchin monkey solved the traptube task by adopting a distance-based associative rule. The capuchin inserted the stick in the side of the
tube that was farther from the reward and did not comprehend how the tool action affected the
displacement of the reward inside the tube. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether Sheba and Darrell
had developed a distance-based associative rule to solve the trap-tube task.
Method
Subjects
The subjects in Experiment 2 were those chimpanzees who solved the task in Experiment 1, Sheba and
Darrell.
Apparatus
In addition to the framed trap tube used in Experiment 1 (hereinafter, Trap Tube A), a second tube was
used (Trap Tube B: 50 cm in length and 3. 7 cm in inner diameter) but with a trap opening (7 cm long and
4 cm wide) at 7 cm from the middle part of the tube (see Figure 4). That is, the hole (trap) in Trap Tube B
was closer to one end of the tube. The reward was placed beside the trap (and therefore displaced from
the center of the tube). If the chimpanzees used the position of the reward as a landmark to decide which
side of insertion was correct, the use of the same rule with the new modified apparatus would lead to
failure. In short, the design of Trap Tube B was such that a different success rate from that of Trap Tube
A was predicted if a distance-based rule was adopted.
Design
In Experiment 2, trials with Trap Tube A were alternated with trials with Trap Tube B. Trap Tube B
reversed the distance-based rule that could be used for solving the task.
Procedure
Experiment 2 consisted of 3 blocks of 20 trials each. Trap Tubes A and B were alternated every 5 trials.
For the two apparatuses, the sequences of the side of the tube in which the reward was placed were
matched and consisted of 5 left- and 5 right-hand positions for each tube. For example, in the first block
the sequence was (R stands for right, and L stands for left) RLRRL with Trap Tube A, followed by RLRRL
with Trap Tube B, then LLRLR with Trap Tube A. and followed by LLRLR with Trap Tube B.
This procedure allowed direct comparison of the performance of the subjects with the two types of tubes.

Results
Both Sheba and Darrell solved both conditions highly above chance. In the Trap Tube A condition, both
animals scored 30 solutions out of 30 trials (p < .001, binomial test). In the Trap Tube B condition, out of a
total of 30 trials, there were 29 solutions for Sheba (she failed only in the first trial of this condition, in Trial
1 of Block 1) and 27 solutions for Darrell (he failed in Trials 2 and 9 in Block 1 and in Trial 6 in Block 2).
Both subjects were successful above chance in the Trap Tube B condition (p < .001, binomial test; see
Figure 5).
Figure 4. The two apparatuses used in Experiment 2, according to the possible locations of the reward at the
beginning of each trial. With the reward on the right side, the trap in Trap Tube A (a) is located in the middle
of the tube, but in Trap Tube 8 (b), the trap is displaced from the middle part of the tube, although the reward
is in the same position in the tube as in Panel a. With the reward on the left side, the trap in Trap Tube A (c) is
located in the middle of the tube, but in Trap Tube 8 (d), the trap is displaced from the middle part of the tube,
although the reward is in the same position in the tube as in (3).

As a post hoc comparison, we replicated Experiment 2 of this study with 1 capuchin subject. This monkey
(Roberta) was the only subject of 4 tested who was successful above chance in a previous experiment
with the trap-tube task (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994). Roberta was highly successful with Trap Tube A
(29 solutions out of 30 trials; binomial test, p < .001). In contrast, when the capuchin was tested with Trap
Tube 8, her performance was significantly below chance level (success in 6 out of 30 trials; binomial test,
p < .001). This subject showed a highly significant statistical difference in performance with the two
2
apparatuses, χ (1, N = 60) = 36.27, p < .001 (see Figure 5).
As for Experiment 1, to assess whether the chimpanzees adopted a representational or an anticipatory
strategy, a comparison between the number of solutions achieved by multiple insertions and single
insertions of the stick was performed. When tested with Trap Tube A, Sheba always performed single

insertions; when tested with Trap Tube B, she performed 27 single insertions and 2 multiple insertions.
When tested with Trap Tube A, Darrell performed 28 single insertions and 2 multiple insertions; when
tested with Trap Tube B, he performed 13 single insertions and 14 multiple insertions. These findings
suggest that Sheba was able (as in Experiment 1) to choose beforehand the correct side for insertion in
both conditions (representational strategy), whereas Darrell was able to do so only with Trap Tube A.
When tested with Trap Tube 8, Darrell switched to an anticipatory strategy.
Figure 5. Successful trials with Trap Tube A and with Trap Tube 8 by 2 chimpanzees (Sheba and Darrell) and
1 capuchin monkey (Roberta) in Experiment 2. Each subject was given 30 trials with each apparatus. * p <
.001 (chi-square test).

Discussion
In Experiment 1, repeated exposure to the trap-tube task allowed 2 (of 5) chimpanzees to solve the task
highly above chance. The analysis of their performance allowed us to establish that they represented
beforehand the consequence of their actions and mentally organized a strategy for solution. However,
when a different apparatus was presented (Trap Tube B in Experiment 2), one of the two subjects did not
use the representational strategy anymore.
The results of Experiment 2 rule out the possibility that solution in Experiment 1 was achieved by means
of a distance-based rule and argue in favor of the subjects' taking into account other features of the task.
This indicates that the success of Sheba and Darrell may have been based on a causal understanding of
the relation between action and outcome, because their performance took into account the position of the
trap, which is a crucial feature of the trap-tube task.
The performances of the unsuccessful chimpanzees (Sarah, Kermit, and Bobby) are also worth
discussing because they provide insights into their strategies. Their performance suggests that a
chimpanzee that uses a stick to push a reward out of a tube does not necessarily take into account the
causal relations between its action with the tool and the consequent movement of the reward. In fact,

some behaviors that we describe earlier indicate that these chimpanzees did not necessarily respond
differently to a pending success or failure. The findings suggest that these subjects did not represent
effectively nor anticipate the consequences of their action. Furthermore, the comparison of Bobby's
multiple-insertion trials with Darrell's suggests that Bobby was not able to take advantage of these
opportunities.
Sarah and Bobby (but not Kermit), though unsuccessful, did not choose the side of insertion by chance.
These chimpanzees developed systematic strategies and changed them during the experiment. In
contrast, with the exception of the only successful subject, the other capuchins did not develop any
systematic strategy across blocks, and thus their success rate never deviated from chance (Visalberghi &
Limongelli, 1994). We believe that the production of strategies is an important step for the discovery of a
rule of action that may lead to success or for the discovery of the relation between action and desired
outcome.
Overall, the findings that 3 of 5 chimpanzees were not successful and that it took 70-80 trials for Sheba
and Darrell to solve the task above chance suggest that the task was more difficult than we had expected.
The difficulty of the trap-tube task is also suggested by the preliminary results of an ongoing study in
which 22 children (ages, 27-66 months) were presented with 20 trap-tube trials. Ten out of the 11
younger subjects (below 36 months) performed at chance level. In contrast, 9 out of the 11 older ones
succeeded by representing the requirements of the task: the number of trials to criterion (six correct
responses in a row) ranged from 2 to 11 trials (Limongelli & Visalberghi, 1994). In contrast to adult
humans and older children, our chimpanzees and capuchins did not seem to have an immediate and
complete comprehension of where the action was going to displace the reward.
The trap-tube task allows a finer examination, within and across species, of strategies and processes of
solution. In capuchin monkeys the presence of the task, at best, led 1 subject (out of 4) to develop an
anticipatory strategy based on the distance of the reward from the openings. Instead, 2 chimpanzees (out
of 5) developed a representational strategy that took into account the presence of the trap.
Despite the fact that some major species differences were found, we believe that further experiments are
needed to evaluate which causal relations are mastered by chimpanzees using tools, and which physical
constraints are taken into account. Furthermore, it is also important to assess the extent to which
associative learning played a role in the kind of analysis of the task achieved by our successful
chimpanzees.
Studies by Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen (1990, 1992) have suggested that chimpanzees are capable of
mental attribution, perspective taking, and empathy, which all require causal understanding. For example,
chimpanzees were able to attribute knowledge to an experimenter who witnessed the hiding of food and
not to one who did not. In contrast, monkeys did not seem to be able to pass the same kind of tests
(Povinelli, Parks, & Novak, 1991, 1992; for a discussion, see Heyes, 1993). Our findings, which suggest
that chimpanzees may be able to understand the causal relationships between their action and the
outcome, match the evidence for such a capacity in the social domain.
Recently, the theoretical debate on language, deception, and other abilities related to social intelligence in
nonhumans has suggested that similar performances may develop from rather different cognitive
capacities and that extreme caution is necessary when describing, labeling. and interpreting them.
Several authors have urged the necessity of controlled experimentation (e.g., Heyes, 1993; Kummer et
al., 1990). The similarities of forms and variety in the use of tools in some nonhuman primate species
warrant further investigation. The extent to which the forms of tool-using activities in nonhumans emerge
from similar strategies and processes and therefore represent similar comprehension of the key features

of a task must be more fully explored. Tool use will remain a useful label only if researchers become
aware of what a tool is in the mind of its user.
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